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When should animals share food? Game theory1
applied to kleptoparasitic populations with food2
sharing3
4
Abstract5
Animals adopt varied foraging tactics in order to survive. Kleptoparasitism,6
where animals attempt to steal food already discovered by others, is very common7
among animal species. In this situation, depending on the ecological conditions,8
challenged animals might defend, share or even, retreat and leave their food to9
the challenger. A key determinant of the likely behaviour is the nature of the10
food itself. If food is discovered in divisible clumps, it can be divided between11
animals in a number of ways. This is the general assumption in one type of game-12
theoretical models of food stealing, producer-scrounger models. Alternatively, food13
items may be essentially indivisible, so that sharing is impossible and either the14
attacker or defender must retain control of all of the food. This is the assumption15
of the alternative game-theoretical models of kleptoparasitism. In this paper, using16
a game-theoretic approach, we relax this assumption of indivisibility and introduce17
the possibility of limited food sharing behaviour between animals in kleptoparasitic18
populations. Considering the conditions under which food sharing is likely to be19
common, it is shown that food sharing should occur in a wide range of ecological20
conditions. In particular, if food availability is limited, the sharing process does not21
greatly reduce the short-term consumption rate of food and food defence has a high22
cost and/or a low probability of success, then the use of the food sharing strategy is23
beneficial. Thus, the assumption of the indivisibility of food items is an important24
component of previous models.25
Key words: social foraging, food stealing, evolutionary games, strategy, ESS.26
1
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Introduction27
In many biological situations, animals may decide to share their food in order to avoid28
any injuries or energetic and time costs of a possible conflict with an attacking foraging29
animal, or to obtain other immediate or delayed benefits such as mating opportunities30
and reciprocal altruism. Food sharing is commonly observed in animal populations in a31
wide range of species, including social carnivores, insects, birds, cetaceans, vampire bats32
and primates (see Feistner and McGrew, 1989; Stevens and Gilby, 2004, for reviews).33
In the literature, food sharing is defined in many different ways and various theoretical34
models have been developed to consider the different biological situations where food35
sharing among animals occurs. In the rest of this paper, we consider food sharing in36
kleptoparasitic populations, populations where foraging animals steal food discovered37
by others. We define food sharing to be the situation where the resource owner shows38
tolerance and allows a competitor animal to consume a part of its food although it has39
the ability to fight and try to keep all of its food.40
Kleptoparasitism is a common foraging strategy. Different forms of kleptoparasitic41
behaviour are observed in many species of animals, for example species of spiders (e.g.,42
Coyl et al., 1991), birds (e.g., Brockman and Barnard, 1979), snails (e.g., Iyengar, 2002),43
lizards (e.g., Cooper and Perez-Mellado, 2003), fish (e.g., Hamilton and Dill, 2003), pri-44
mates (e.g., Janson, 1985), carnivores (e.g., Carbone et al., 2005) and insects (e.g.,45
Erlandsson, 1988). This behaviour of animals has been recently well documented in a46
review paper (Iyengar, 2008). The biological phenomenon of kleptoparasitism has at-47
tracted the interest of many researchers from different areas. There are a number of48
theoretical models focused on the kleptoparasitic behaviour of animals using different49
mathematical methods, in particular evolutionary game theory. Two of the fundamen-50
tal game-theoretical models which consider kleptoparasitic behaviour are the producer-51
scrounger model, originally introduced by Barnard and Sibly (1981), and the model52
of Broom and Ruxton (1998). In its original form, the producer-scrounger game is a53
frequency-dependent game where animals forage for food using two strategies. They54
either search for food (producer’s strategy) or search for opportunities to kleptopara-55
sitize (scrounger’s strategy). The scrounger strategy does better when scroungers are56
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rare and worse when they are common. When the frequency of the two strategies is57
such that the payoff obtained by each strategy is the same, there is a stable equilibrium58
where the two strategies coexist. Many variations of this model have followed in order59
to consider different factors that might affect the foraging process (e.g., Caraco and60
Giraldeau, 1991; Vickery et al., 1991; Dubois and Giraldeau, 2005). One key feature61
of this type of models is that food is usually discovered in patches and can be easily62
split over foraging animals. Hence, the concept of food sharing is central to these mod-63
els. In addition, in these models costs from aggressive strategies are energetic, rather64
than time, costs. Thus, the different strategies do not directly affect the distribution of65
feeding and foraging animals and the main effect of population density is to reduce the66
“finder’s share”, the portion of the food eaten by a finder before other foragers discover67
it. The model of Broom and Ruxton (1998), based on the mechanistic model of Ruxton68
and Moody (1997), follows a different approach. Food comes in single indivisible items,69
which must be consumed completely by an individual. Thus, food can never be shared70
and challenging animals attempt to steal the whole item from the owner (or not). In71
particular, in this model it is assumed that each of the animals in the population ei-72
ther searches for food, has already acquired and is handling a food item prior to its73
consumption or fights with another animal over a food item. When foraging animals74
encounter an animal in the handling state, they can either decide to attack in order to75
steal the prey or ignore the handler animal and continue searching. Attacked animals76
always defend their food and a fight takes place. The population density has a direct77
effect in this model as fights take time, with this loss of time the cost of more aggressive78
strategies, and the more potential kleptoparasites there are, the more time is wasted on79
fighting. The model predicts the optimal strategy for a foraging animal (to attack or80
not to attack) under varying food availability and fight time cost. Broom et al. (2004)81
later reconstructed this model in a more general framework by introducing different82
competitive abilities between the attacker and the attacked animal and allowing the83
attacked animal to surrender its food to the attacker avoiding the time cost of a fight. A84
series of publications has appeared developing the original model of Broom and Ruxton85
(1998) in a number of ways (e.g., Broom and Ruxton, 2003; Broom and Rychtar, 2007;86
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Luther et al., 2007; Yates and Broom, 2007; Broom et al., 2008; Broom and Rychar,87
2009; Broom and Rychtar, 2011). Crowe et al. (2009) provide a brief review on the main88
theoretical work on kleproparasitism prior to the investigation of a stochastic model of89
kleptoparasitism in finite populations. A comparison between some main models of90
kleptoparasitism following the two fundamental game-theoretic approaches is discussed91
in Vahl (2006) (see Chapter 6) and an alternative model is presented. There is also a92
series of related mechanistic, but not game-theoretic, models which investigate interfer-93
ence competition where foraging animals engage in aggressive interactions in order for94
example to defend their territory, resulting in negative effects on their foraging efficiency95
(e.g., Beddington, 1975; Ruxton et al., 1992; Van der Meer and Ens, 1997; Vahl, 2006;96
Smallegange and Van der Meer, 2009; Van der Meer and Smallegange, 2009).97
There are many game-theoretical models which investigate sharing behaviour as an98
alternative strategy of foraging animals. The Dove strategy in the famous and widely99
used Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982) can be100
thought of as an example of this non-aggressive behaviour. However, the Hawk-Dove101
game and a large number of variations of this game (see for example, Sirot, 2000; Dubois102
et al., 2003) are unable to show why in many biological situations animals prefer to share103
the acquired prey without any contest taking place. The non-aggressive behaviour of the104
Dove is shown to never be a pure Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), i.e. a strategy105
that if adopted by the population cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy, and106
can only exist as a mixed ESS (with Hawks) in a proportion depending on the value of107
the resource and the cost of a potential contest. This is mainly due to the fact that the108
Hawk-Dove game considers just a single contest between the two strategies. Although109
the reward of adopting the Hawk strategy against an animal playing Hawk might be110
equal or lower than the reward of adopting the Dove strategy, in a contest between a111
Hawk and a Dove, the Hawk is always the optimal strategy. However, in group foraging112
populations, animals usually have repeated interactions over food items. In iterated113
Hawk-Dove type games, it has been shown that if the attacked animal can adopt the114
strategy of its opponent (for example play a Retaliator type strategy (Maynard Smith115
and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982) or a tit-for-tat type strategy (Axelrod and116
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Hamilton, 1981)) then, under some circumstances, food sharing without any aggressive117
interactions might be an ESS (Dubois and Giraldeau, 2003, 2007). A different game-118
theoretical food sharing model is considered in Stevens and Stephens (2002) in a situation119
where the owner of the food might decide to share its food with a beggar due to the120
fitness costs of harassment or interference (e.g. screams, slapping of the ground, grabbing121
at the food). In this case, it is shown that food sharing might be the optimal choice for122
the food owner in situations where the fitness cost caused by the beggar’s harassment,123
if the food is defended, exceeds the fitness cost of sharing.124
In this paper, we extend the model of kleptoparasitism presented in Broom et al.125
(2004) by assuming divisible food items and allowing animals to share their prey with126
attacking foraging animals. A foraging animal, encountering an animal handling a food127
item has the possibility to either attack attempting to steal or share the food, or just128
ignore it and continue foraging. On the other hand, an attacked animal which owns129
a food item, has the possibility to defend its food, to share it or to retreat leaving all130
the food to the attacking animal. Through a game-theoretic approach we examine the131
optimal strategy for an animal under different ecological circumstances.132
The model133
In a population of foragers of density P , each animal might either be in a state of134
searching for food, or a state where it is handling a food item that it has acquired. Let135
S denote the density of searchers and H the density of handlers. Each handler consumes136
the food item and resumes searching in a time drawn from an exponential distribution137
with mean th, so equivalently following a Markov process at rate t
−1
h . There is a constant138
density of food items f available and searchers cover an area νf per unit time whilst139
searching for food, so that they find food at rate νff . As well as finding food themselves140
when foraging, searchers can acquire food by trying to steal it from a handler, and they141
can search an area νh per unit time for handlers. Once a searcher comes upon a handler,142
it attacks to either steal or share the food item with probability p1 or ignores the handler143
with probability 1 − p1 and continues searching for food. If the searcher attacks, the144
handler might decide to resist and defend its food item. This happens with probability145
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which we label p3. In this case, the attacking searcher (A) and the defender (R) engage in146
a fight. The rate at which searchers encounter handlers and engage in a fight (become147
attackers, A) is equal to p1p3νhH while handlers are found by searchers and resist a148
possible attack (become defenders, R) with rate p1p3νhS. The fight lasts for a time149
drawn from an exponential distribution with mean ta/2. The attacker animal wins the150
fight and becomes a handler with probability α and thus, with the same probability,151
the defender loses its food and starts searching again; so this happens at rate 2α/ta.152
Otherwise, the attacking searcher loses the fight and returns to the searching state with153
rate 2(1−α)/ta and thus, with the same rate, the defender wins and continues handling154
its food. Note that the winner of the fight might face other subsequent challenges. In155
general, the circumstances under which fights occur might give a high advantage to156
defender or attacker (the attacker might have to catch the defender in the air, but the157
defender may be hampered by a heavy food item) and so α may be significantly greater158
or less than 0.5.159
So far, the model described is the same as the model investigated in Broom et al.160
(2004). In this paper, this model is extended by assuming that attacked animals can161
share a food item as follows. Assume that food items are divisible. The attacked handler162
might decide to share its food with an attacking searcher, with probability p2. In this163
case, searchers become sharers (C) with rate p1p2νhH and the attacked handlers with164
rate p1p2νhS. If the handler decides to share its food with the searcher, both take a165
half of the food. It is assumed, for reasons of simplicity, that both the two sharers166
hold the food item and feed simultaneously on it. This discourages other animals from167
attempting to steal or share the food since this would be a difficult, risky and dangerous168
venture. So, food sharing results in the mutual protection of the two sharers from other169
predators. As a result, a sharer animal consumes its portion of the food item without170
any interruptions. Sharers eat their food unperturbed and again become searchers in a171
time drawn from an exponential distribution with mean tc or equivalently with rate t
−1
c .172
Once the half of the food item is consumed, the sharer starts foraging again. Throughout173
the paper, it is assumed that 2tc ≥ th, i.e. the decision of food sharing might either174
have no time cost or has some cost, but is never beneficial with respect to the handling175
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time.176
The attacked handler, in order to avoid any time cost either from a fight or the sharing177
process, might decide neither to defend its food item nor to share it, but to leave it to178
the attacking animal and return to the searching state. This happens with probability179
1− p2− p3 for any challenge, and so occurs at rate p1(1− p2− p3)νhH for each searcher180
and rate p1(1− p2 − p3)νhS for each handler.181
The model parameters and notations are summarised in Table 1.182
The differential equation based compartmental model that describes the dynamic of the183
different groups of the population in the above situation is the following184
dS
dt
=
1
th
H +
1
tc
C +
2
ta
(1− α)A+
2
ta
αR− νffS − p1 (p2 + p3) νhSH, (1)
dH
dt
= νffS +
2
ta
αA+
2
ta
(1− α)R−
1
th
H − p1 (p2 + p3) νhSH, (2)
dC
dt
= 2p1p2νhSH −
1
tc
C, (3)
dA
dt
= p1p3νhSH −
2
ta
A, (4)
dR
dt
= p1p3νhSH −
2
ta
R. (5)
The above system of equations is a closed system where the population density, P ,185
remains constant, i.e.186
P = S +H + C +A+R, (6)
and one of the equations (1)–(5) is thus redundant.187
We assume that the population rapidly converges to the equilibrium state (see Luther188
and Broom (2004) for a proof of this assumption for the original model of Broom and189
Ruxton (1998)). In the equilibrium conditions, the densities of the different groups of190
the population, S,H,C,A and R, are given by (see Appendix A)191
(S,H,C,A,R) =
(
H
thd(H, p1, p2)
, H,
2p1p2tcνhH
2
thd(H, p1, p2)
,
1
2
p1p3taνhH
2
thd(H, p1, p2)
,
1
2
p1p3taνhH
2
thd(H, p1, p2)
)
,
(7)
where d(H, p1, p2) = νff − p1p2νhH, i.e. the difference between the rate at which192
searchers discover food items and the rate at which they become sharers. Note that this193
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term is clearly positive since every food item can be shared at most once (and some are194
not shared), and it must be discovered beforehand. By (6) and (7), H is given by the195
biologically relevant solution of the quadratic equation196
p1
(
p2(2tc − th) + p3ta
)
νhH
2 +
(
p1p2thνhP + thνff + 1
)
H − thνffP = 0, (8)
i.e. the positive solution,197
H =
−(p1p2thνhP+thνff+1)+
√
(p1p2thνhP+thνff+1)
2
+4p1thνffνhP
(
p2(2tc−th)+p3ta
)
2p1νh
(
p2(2tc−th)+p3ta
) ,
(9)
given that 2p1νh
(
p2(2tc − th) + p3ta
)
> 0.198
Optimal strategies199
We are interested in finding conditions under which animals playing strategy (p1, p2, p3),200
i.e. animals which attack handlers with probability p1 and share or defend their food201
when they are attacked with probability p2 and p3, respectively, have greater fitness than202
animals playing any other strategy (q1, q2, q3). We are ultimately looking for conditions203
when the overall strategy (p1, p2, p3) is an ESS.204
A strategy is considered to be the optimal strategy if it minimizes the average time205
needed to the consumption of a food item. This would result in the maximising of the206
long-term food intake rate of an animal playing this strategy and thus its fitness.207
Average time for a single animal to consume a food item208
Assume that a mutant animal playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) invades into a population209
playing strategy (p1, p2, p3).210
If the mutant is at the searching state and encounters a handler it has two options:211
- It attacks in order to share or steal the food item with probability q1. Note that212
once it attacks, what will happen next depends on the handler’ s strategy.213
- It ignores the handler animal and continues searching for a food item for itself214
with probability 1− q1.215
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The time needed for the mutant searcher, who has just come upon a handler playing the216
population strategy, to consume a food item, T ∗SA, in the different scenarios is represented217
schematically in the diagram shown in Figure 1. The notation of food consumption times218
from the different foraging states is shown in Table 2.219
If the mutant is at the handling state and is attacked by a searcher animal playing the220
population strategy it has three options:221
- It shares the food item with probability q2.222
- It defends its food and a fight takes place with probability q3.223
- It leaves the food to the attacker and resumes searching with probability 1−q2−q3.224
The time required for the attacked mutant handler to consume a food item, T ∗HA, in the
different scenarios is represented schematically in the diagram shown in Figure 2.
It is shown (see Appendix B) that T ∗SA and T
∗
HA are given by the solution of the following
system of equations
(
1−
(
1− q1 +
q1p2
2
+ (1− α)q1p3
) νhH
νff + νhH
)
T ∗SA = q1p2tc + q1p3
ta
2
+
+
(
1− q1 +
q1p2
2
+ (1− α)q1p3
) 1
νff + νhH
+
+
((
1−
q1p2
2
)
νff + q1
(
1− p2 − (1− α)p3
)
νhH
)
th(1 + νhST
∗
HA)
(1 + thνhS)(νff + νhH)
. (10)

1−
((
1− p1q22
)
νff +
(
1− p1 + (1− α)p1q3
)
νhH
)
thνhS
(1 + thνhS)(νff + νhH)

T ∗HA = p1q2tc + p1q3 ta2 +
+
((
1−
p1q2
2
)
νff +
(
1− p1 + (1− α)p1q3
)
νhH
)
th
(1 + thνhS)(νff + νhH)
+
+ p1
(
1−
q2
2
− (1− α)q3
) 1 + νhHT ∗SA
νff + νhH
. (11)
The average required time to the consumption of a food item for a single searcher animal225
of a population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3), who has just met a handler animal of this226
population, TSA, and the respective time of a single handler of the same population who227
has just met a searcher, THA, can be found by solving the system of equations (10) and228
(11) substituting (p1, p2, p3) for (q1, q2, q3).229
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In the case where all the members of the population do not challenge, i.e. p1 = q1 = 0,
the strategy used by an animal in the handling position may be thought irrelevant since
none of the animals will ever be attacked and thus each searcher finds a food item for
itself in an average time equal to 1/νff and each handler consumes a discovered food
item in time th. However, we assume that occasionally a challenge occurs “by mistake”
(this is a version of the classical trembling hand argument of Selten (1975)). Thus, a
handler animal of a population where animals never challenge, at some point is faced by
a foraging animal which attempts to steal or share the food. In this case, the average
time needed for the attacked handler animal to consume a food item if it adopts a
different from the population strategy, (0, q2, q3), is given by (see Appendix B)
T ∗HA = q2
(
tc −
1
2
(
1
νff
+ th
))
+ q3
(
ta
2
− (1− α)
1
νff
)
+
1
νff
+ th. (12)
If a mutant animal can invade a population then its strategy (q1, q2, q3) is a better230
strategy than that of the population (p1, p2, p3) at least at one of the two decision points,231
when a searcher and potentially making a challenge or when receiving a challenge as232
a handler. A mutant which follows a different strategy from that of the population at233
just one decision point and the strategy which is followed is better than that of the234
population, can obviously invade. When considering whether a particular strategy is an235
ESS or not, it is sufficient to investigate invasion by mutants which differ in strategy at236
one of the two decision points only. This is because if a mutant which differ in strategy237
at both of the decision points can invade, it must have a superior strategy at at least one238
of the decision points, and so an animal which shares the same strategy as the mutant239
at this decision point, and the same strategy as the population at the other, could also240
invade.241
A mutant which uses a strategy different from that of the population at just the242
searching state is considered to use a better strategy, and thus be able to invade, if243
T ∗SA ≤ TSA, i.e. if the decision that it will make at the point when it will meet a handler,244
when searching for food, will lead to a smaller time until the consumption of a food item.245
Similarly, a mutant which plays differently from the population just at the handling state246
is considered to be able to invade if the decision it will make in an encounter with a247
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searcher, when handling a food item, will shorten the time to the consumption of a food248
item, i.e. if T ∗HA ≤ THA. Note that it is possible that under certain parameters T
∗
SA is249
independent of q1 and all values 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1 give identical times. Similarly, T
∗
HA might250
be independent of q2 and q3. In these circumstances, in such asymmetric games, the251
population can still be invaded by genetic drift.252
In Appendix C, it is demonstrated through a combination of analytical and numerical253
investigation that the optimal strategy in either decision points is always pure (in some254
cases this is proved, in others it is not proved but an extensive numerical investigation255
has yielded consistent results with no mixed ESSs). Thus, if the population plays a non-256
pure strategy (p1, p2, p3), for an invading animal there will be a pure strategy that will257
do at least as well as playing the population strategy, and so (p1, p2, p3) could not be an258
ESS since this pure strategy would invade the population. Hence, we need to consider259
only two strategies for a foraging animal (always or never attempt to steal or share the260
prey of the other animal when the opportunities arise) and three strategic choices for261
the attacked animal (either always surrender the food to the attacking animal, always262
share the food or always defend it) as the components of the potential optimal strategy263
in any given population. Therefore, there are six possible pure strategies that an animal264
can use and need to be considered:265
- Strategy (0,0,0) (Dove, D): the animal does never challenge handlers and does266
never resist any challenges.267
- Strategy (0,1,0) (Non-Attacking Sharer, NAS): the animal does never challenge268
handlers and always shares its food when it is challenged.269
- Strategy (0,0,1) (Retaliator, R): the animal does never challenge handlers but270
always resists when it is challenged.271
- Strategy (1,0,0) (Marauder, M): the animal challenges handlers at every opportu-272
nity but it does never resist any challenges.273
- Strategy (1,1,0) (Attacking Sharer, AS): the animal challenges handlers at every274
opportunity and it always shares the food when it is challenged.275
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- Strategy (1,0,1) (Hawk, H): the animal challenges handlers at every opportunity276
and it always resists any challenges.277
The optimal strategy for an animal at the searching state278
Consider a population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3) that is potentially invaded by a mu-279
tant animal playing a different strategy (q1, q2, q3). For reasons explained in the previous280
section, in order to study whether the mutant can evolve because it uses a better strat-281
egy at the searching state, we assume that the strategy which is used by all the animals282
when they are at the handling state is the same, i.e. p2 = q2 and p3 = q3. We consider283
the strategy used by a searcher animal of the population when coming across a handler,284
p1, to be advantageous over a mutant strategy, q1, (and thus the population cannot285
be invaded by the mutant) if the average time required for the searcher playing the286
population strategy to gain and consume a food item, TSA, is less than that required287
for the mutant searcher, T ∗SA. Using the equations (10), (11) and (7)–(9) we find all288
the necessary conditions under which a mutant playing strategy q1 ∈ {0, 1 : q1 6= p1}289
cannot invade a population playing strategy p1 ∈ {0, 1 : p1 6= q1} for the cases where290
either p2 = q2 = 0 and p3 = q3 = 1, p2 = q2 = 1 and p3 = q3 = 0 or p2 = q2 = 0 and291
p3 = q3 = 0. These are summarised in Table 3 (conditions (C.3), (C.6), (C9), (C.10),292
(C.13) and (C.16)).293
The optimal strategy for an animal at the handling state294
In the handling position an animal can use three strategies when it is challenged. Either295
it shares the food with the challenger, it defends its food or it retreats leaving the296
food to the attacking animal, and depending on the ecological conditions it obtains the297
highest benefit when it always takes one of these three actions. As before, assume that298
a population already at equilibrium conditions is invaded by a mutant, which now uses299
a different strategy as a handler but the same strategy as a searcher.300
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Optimal strategies in an aggressive population301
Assume that all the members of the population behave aggressively when encountering302
a handler animal, i.e. p1 = q1 = 1. We consider the strategy of an attacked handler303
of the population to be advantageous over the strategy used by an attacked handler304
mutant (and thus the mutant cannot invade) if the average time required for the first to305
consume a food item, THA, is less than that required for the second, T
∗
HA (in this case,306
this is equivalent to the comparison of TSA with T
∗
SA since the times needed for animals307
which always challenge, i.e. when p1 = q1 = 1, to acquire a food item and be discovered308
by a foraging animal are identical, independently of the strategies they use as handlers).309
Using again the equations (10), (11) and (7)–(9) we find the necessary conditions under310
which a mutant in this scenario cannot invade a population playing a different strategy311
at the handling state. These conditions are presented in Table 3 (conditions (C.11),312
(C.12), (C14), (C.15), (C.17) and (C.18)).313
Optimal strategies in a non-aggressive population314
In the case where all the members of the population do not challenge, i.e. p1 = q1 = 0, an315
animal of the population playing (0, p2, p3) does better than a mutant playing (0, q2, q3),316
and thus the population cannot be invaded by this mutant, if THA < T
∗
HA, where by317
(12) (THA in this case is similarly given by (12) substituting p2 and p3 for q2 and q3,318
respectively) we obtain the condition319
(q2 − p2)
(
tc −
1
2
(
1
νff
+ th
))
+ (q3 − p3)
(
ta
2
− (1− α)
1
νff
)
> 0. (13)
The conditions under which a mutant playing strategy (0, q2, q3) is unable to invade320
a population playing strategy (0, p2, p3) are summarised in Table 3 (conditions (C.1),321
(C.2), (C.4), (C.5), (C.7), (C.8)).322
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies323
Table 3 shows all the appropriate conditions under which a population playing strategy324
(p1, p2, p3) cannot be invaded by a mutant playing a different strategy at one of the325
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two decision points, (q1, q2, q3), for all the possible cases where all animals play a pure326
strategy.327
According to the results shown in Table 3, strategies (0,0,0) and (0,1,0) can never328
resist all of the possible invading strategies and there are thus four possible ESSs:329
- Strategy (0,0,1) is an ESS if the conditions (C.7), (C.8) and (C.9) are satisfied.330
- Strategy (1,0,0) is an ESS if the conditions (C.11) and (C.12) are satisfied.331
- Strategy (1,1,0) is an ESS if the conditions (C.13), (C.14) and (C.15) are satisfied.332
- Strategy (1,0,1) is an ESS if the conditions (C.16), (C.17) and (C.18) are satisfied.333
Figure 3 shows the regions in parameter space in which each of the four strategies,334
Retaliator, Marauder, Attacking Sharer and Hawk, is an ESS, for specific parameter335
values as the duration of the contest, ta/2, and the handling time of a sharer, tc, vary.336
Figure 4 shows how these regions vary as the density of the population, P , and the337
rate at which foragers find undiscovered food, νff , vary. Obviously, these regions in the338
ta, tc plane in Figure 3 and P, νff plane in Figure 4 will vary, depending on the other339
parameter values. However, some general conclusions can be extracted. Figure 3 and340
Figure 4 suggests that between the regions where two strategies are unique ESSs, there341
can be a region where the two strategies are simultaneous ESSs and among the regions342
of three pairs of ESSs configured by three strategies, there might be a region where the343
three strategies might coexist as ESSs. This excludes the possibility of the Retaliator344
and the Hawk strategies being simultaneous ESSs, since this can never happen due to the345
contradiction of the conditions (C.9) and (C.16) (see Table 3). This gives eleven distinct346
regions as summarised in Figure 3 and Figure 4. It appears that every set of parameters347
yields one or more pure ESSs. Numerical examples on a wide range of parameter values348
indicate that there is no parameter set where this is not the case i.e. that there are not349
any mixtures of strategies or cases where there are no ESSs. Although we do not believe350
that there will be any parameter set where there will be such a polymorphic mixture or351
no ESS (in similar models such cases do not occur, and see Appendix C for an argument352
that actual mixed strategy ESSs are not possible), we cannot definitively rule out this353
possibility.354
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Predictions of the model355
In the case where neither the members of the population nor any mutant share the food,356
i.e. in the case where p2 = q2 = 0, all the above results agree with the results obtained in357
previous work (Broom et al., 2004). Hence, here we concentrate on the cases where the358
members of the population or a mutant animal or both, always share their food when359
they are attacked, i.e. cases where either p2 or q2 or both are equal to 1. This provides360
both new potential ESSs and also new mutant strategies to invade other strategies, so361
that strategies that were ESSs in Broom et al. (2004) will no longer be in some cases.362
In a non-attacking population, a sharer does better than a Dove when they are363
attacked if the average time needed for a sharer to consume a whole food item (tc +364
((1/νff)+ th)/2) is less than the average time needed to find an undiscovered food item365
(1/νff) and consume it (th) (equivalently in this case, if the time the sharer needs to366
consume the half of the food item (tc) is on average less than half of the time needed to367
find and consume a whole food item(((1/νff)+th)/2)). On the other hand, an Attacking368
Sharer mutant does better than a member of a population of Non-Attacking Sharers if369
tc ≤ ((1/νff) + th)/2 as well. Hence, as we see in Table 3, condition (C.4) contradicts370
condition (C.6) and thus a Non-Attacking Sharer is never an ESS. The food sharing371
strategy can be an ESS only if the sharer challenges a handler at every opportunity372
when it is at the searching state. A population of Attacking Sharers can potentially373
be invaded by Non-Attacking Sharers, Marauders and Hawks. The conditions under374
which a Non-Attacking Sharer and a Marauder can invade a population of Attacking375
Sharers are the same. This occurs because in such a population a Marauder can invade376
if it is better for any handler to give up a food item rather than share (so being a377
searcher is better than sharing a food item) and a Non-Attacking Sharer can invade if378
it is better not to challenge for a food item, which will be shared (so again searching is379
better than sharing). Increasing the rate at which foragers find food, νff , increases the380
parameter range where Non-Attacking Sharers and Marauders invade the population of381
Attacking Sharers. Depending on the values of the other parameters, the increase of νff382
might favour the invasion of Hawks as well (usually when food is difficult to discover).383
Hence, increasing νff decreases the range of the parameter values in which the Attacking384
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Sharer strategy is an ESS (see Figure 3 for an example). A similar situation appears by385
decreasing the area in which foragers search for handling sharers per unit time, νh. As386
it is observed in Figure 4 and the conditions (C.13)–(C.15), the decrease of the density387
of the population, P , might also create unpropitious circumstances for food sharing.388
For a given set of parameter values for which the Attacking Sharer strategy is an ESS,389
increasing the time cost of the sharing process which results in the increase of tc, the area390
where the Attacking Sharer strategy is an ESS reduces, as one would expect. Depending391
on the other ecological conditions, this strategy might coexist as an ESS with either one392
of the other possible ESSs (Retaliator, Marauder or Hawk) or two of them (Retaliator393
and Marauder or Marauder and Hawk). At very high levels of tc such that the time spent394
in sharing would be better spent in searching for another food item or in defending the395
food item, Attacking Sharer cannot be an ESS. In this case, the predictions of the model396
approach those of the model of Broom et al. (2004), where sharing was not possible.397
In conditions where the duration of aggressive interactions is high, the defending strategy398
is less profitable and thus the avoidance of any aggressive interaction is favoured. Hence,399
under these circumstances, it is observed that animals should decide either to surrender400
their food (use the Marauder strategy) or to share it (use the Attacking Sharer strategy)401
when they are challenged, even if they have a high probability of defending their food402
successfully. Therefore, at high fight durations each of Marauder and Attacking Sharer403
strategies might be the unique ESS or both might be ESSs simultaneously.404
A special case405
As a special case, we consider the case where 2tc = th, i.e. where sharing does not reduce406
the speed of food consumption. The results obtained in this case are shown in Table 4.407
It is observed that, as well as the Dove and Non-Attacking Sharer strategies which as408
we have seen in the previous section are never ESSs, in this case the Marauder strategy409
is also never an ESS since it can always be invaded by an Attacking Sharer animal. The410
Attacking Sharer strategy can only be invaded by the Hawk strategy. Moreover, this can411
happen just in few cases where the chance of a successful defence is relatively high, i.e.412
the probability α is relatively small, and the time spent in a contest, ta/2, is small. For413
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α ≥ 0.5, the conditions (C.7) and (C.9) indicate that the Retaliator strategy can never414
be an ESS. In this case, the condition (C.18) also indicates that an Attacking Sharer415
can always invade a population playing Hawk and thus the Hawk strategy can never416
be an ESS as well. Hence, at least for α ≥ 0.5, Attacking Sharer is the only ESS no417
matter what the other parameter values are. The Hawk strategy is an ESS mainly when418
ta/2 and α are small. As ta/2 and/or α increase, depending on the other parameter419
values, there might be a range where Hawks and Attacking Sharers coexist as ESSs.420
When the defender is likely to succeed, i.e. α is small, defence of the food item might be421
the favoured strategy even if the fight time is relatively long, especially in cases where422
available food is scarce. Hence, there is a range where the Retaliator strategy is either423
the only ESS or coexists with the Attacking Sharer strategy. Figure 5 shows a region424
with all the possible ESSs in this specific case, as the probability α of the challenger425
winning and the duration of the content, ta/2, vary.426
Discussion427
Food sharing is a very common tactic adopted by a broad group of animal species for428
their survival. Using a game theoretic approach, the present model investigates the429
ecological circumstances under which animals should share their food when they are430
challenged by other foraging animals. We have extended the game-theoretical model431
of Broom et al. (2004) by allowing animals to share their food. Hence, animals in this432
model can choose among two additional strategies: either to attempt to share or steal433
the food from a handler when foraging and share their food when they are challenged434
by a forager, or to ignore any opportunities to share or to steal food when foraging but435
share when another animal attacks. This model is likely to be an improvement if caught436
food items are at least partly divisible, for instance fruit species (e.g., White, 1994), as437
opposed to for example a nut or a fish (e.g., Iyengar, 2008) which are hard to divide,438
in which case the original modelling system will be more appropriate. At the opposite439
extreme, in situations where food items come in patches, for instance seed patches (e.g.,440
Barnard and Sibly, 1981), which are easily divisible, then the producer-scrounger type441
models (e.g., Dubois and Giraldeau, 2003; Dubois et al., 2003; Dubois and Giraldeau,442
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2005, 2007) could be appropriate models.443
Considering the time cost needed for a food item to be acquired and consumed, the444
model predicts that there is a wide range of ecological conditions in which attempting to445
share or steal the food at every opportunity and sharing the food when attacked is the446
optimal strategy that should be used by animals. The non-aggressive strategy where447
animals do not challenge other animals but share their food when challenged can never448
be an ESS since depending on the ecological parameters this strategy is always invaded449
either by the Dove or the Attacking Sharer strategy. This adds one possible ESS to450
the model of Broom et al. (2004). Investigation of the model suggests that under any451
ecological parameters, there is always at least one ESS that an animal can use. Every452
two ESSs can occur as ESSs simultaneously, apart from the Retaliator and the Hawk453
strategy where it is shown that they can never be ESSs simultaneously. It is also possible454
that under some conditions there are three simultaneous ESSs (Retaliator, Marauder455
and Attacking Sharer or Marauder, Attacking Sharer and Hawk).456
Different ecological factors might influence the strategic choice of food sharing. Food457
availability is one of the crucial factors. In conditions of limited food, the use of the458
Attacking Sharer strategy is enhanced while at high food densities, food sharing becomes459
a less profitable strategy. A high time cost of food defence, a small probability of460
a successful food defence, a high rate at which searchers encounter handlers, a high461
population density and a low time cost of food sharing are also conditions which favour462
animals sharing their food. In the special case where food sharing has no additional463
time cost, foraging animals should almost always attempt to share food with a handler464
and handlers should almost always share their food. Defending the food might be the465
optimal strategy for the owner, especially when food is difficult to be discovered, and the466
success of this is likely. Moreover, attacking at every opportunity and defending when467
attacked is an ESS in just very few cases, where the time cost of the defence is small,468
but never attack and always defend might be an ESS even if the defence will result in a469
high time cost. Attack and always retreat when attacked never occurs in this case since470
sharing is always a better strategy.471
Food sharing is a complicated mechanism. Different animal species share their food472
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for different reasons and under different ecological and biological conditions. In many473
situations, food sharing is a voluntary process where animals choose to share their474
food without any kind of menace from other foraging animals coming before. This475
process might result to immediate benefits for animals, for example the creation of476
cooperation for the increase of foraging success or predation avoidance, or to increase477
mating opportunities (see Stevens and Gilby, 2004). It is also often the case that sharing478
occurs between relatives or between animals with a social interaction, even if those479
animals are not relatives e.g. between roost mates (Wilkinson, 1990). As a result, food480
sharing might not be immediately beneficial but result in long term benefits such as481
future reciprocal sharing, i.e. altruism (see Stevens and Gilby, 2004). In the present482
model, food sharing is considered to be the process where a food owner shows tolerance483
to an attacking animal and shares its food with it, although it would be better for484
the owner not to be discovered by any other animal. This animal behaviour might485
occur in cases where a beggar challenges a food owner, a situation which is observed486
in monkeys and chimpanzees populations (see Stevens and Gilby (2004) for examples487
of this behaviour). The particularity of this model compared to other models in the488
literature, is that by sharing food, the two animals protect each other from potential489
subsequent costly challenges that might extend the time until the consumption of a food490
item. Hence, on average a half of the food item is consumed without the risk of other491
delays apart from the time required for sharing. This, under certain conditions, might492
be the least costly process with respect to the expected time needed for the consumption493
of food and thus a process which maximises the food intake rate. Although there is no494
empirical data to support precisely the above assumptions, there is evidence that in495
nature, animals in many cases prefer to share food with other animals to reduce the risk496
of losing the entire prey. For example, a lion instead of defending its prey against an497
approaching member of the pride, it might share it in order to increase the efficiency of498
defending the prey from invading hyenas (see for example, Cooper, 1991; Stevens and499
Gilby, 2004).500
In addition, our model assumes that the members of the population are of the same501
type. However, real populations consist of individuals with biological and physiological502
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differences and the optimal strategic choices depend on the characteristics of the individ-503
uals and those of their opponent. For example, recent observational and experimental504
studies on the dung roller beetle Canthon cyanellus cyanellus have shown that males of505
similar size are more likely to share the resource rather than to defend it (Chamorro-506
Florescano et al., 2010). Fight duration may be correlated with the differences between507
the opponents as well (e.g., Rovero et al., 2000). The size and the quality of the food508
items or the estimation of the value of the resource might also affect significantly the509
frequency of food sharing (see for example, White, 1994) as well as a contest duration510
(see for example, Enquist and Leimar, 1987).511
In our model all costs are expressed in terms of time used and we ignore other costs512
which can be important, such as energy costs and possible injuries resulting from fights513
(for a model which incorporates energy costs see Vahl, 2006). For simplicity we do514
not impose extra time penalties on animals in contests. A resulting limitation is that515
the winner and the loser of a contest face the same cost. Although this can be the516
case in nature (e.g., Smith and Taylor, 1993), experimental studies have shown that517
either the loser (e.g., Chellapa and Hungtingford, 1989; Neat et al., 1998) or the winner518
(e.g., Hack, 1997) might suffer higher energetic or other cost, such as a high recovery519
time cost (see also, Luther and Broom, 2004). For instance, if the handler uses more520
energy (e.g. because it is carrying a food item during the contest) then it might need521
a higher recovery time. This would decrease the food intake rate making the defending522
strategy less attractive and the choice of alternative strategies more likely. In the same523
way, although it is assumed that the cost from the sharing process is equal for the524
two animals that share food, in reality the two animals might suffer a different cost.525
Furthermore, it is assumed that once an animal loses a contest with another animal, it526
does not initiate a new fight with the same animal but starts searching for alternative527
food resources. This is generally reasonable, as often contests between animals can have528
strong (at least short-term) effects on their relationship (winner and loser effects) which529
reinforce the dominance of the winner (see for example, Dugatkin, 1997). Similarly, in530
related contests between animals for territory acquisition animals that lose an agonistic531
interaction often leave the areas in which they were defeated (see for example, Stamps532
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and Krishnan, 1994). However, we should note that in some cases an animal may attack533
repeatedly the owner after iterated losing tries (e.g., Stamps, 1994). One way that534
the model could be extended and relax this assumption, is to allow the loser animal535
to attack repeatedly the winner. This could be done, for example, by introducing the536
choice to the loser to attack again or not, following similar assumptions to those in some537
owner-intruder type of games (e.g., Morrell and Kokko, 2003).538
In natural systems, foraging animals might be faced with more than one foraging539
option with different variance in food intake. For example, they might be faced with a540
constant food resource versus a variable food resource, a food resource with fixed delay541
versus the same food resource with variable delay, or an immediate gain of food versus542
a delayed gain. There is strong empirical evidence that a forager’s choice may depend543
on many ecological factors, such as the energetic status of the animal, the type of food544
variance, the energy requirements of the animal within a certain time interval and the545
probability of delays due to different kind of unpredictable interruptions (for example546
bad weather). The forager might be either risk-averse and choose the predictable option,547
or risk-prone and choose a risky option, respectively (see for example, Kacelnik and548
Bateson, 1996). For example, an animal with low food reserves might choose a safe549
lower level of return, provided it was sufficient for survival. Food sharing might be550
a way for animals to reduce such variances in food intake (e.g., Wenzel and Pickering,551
1991). Although the present model does not consider any risk associated with alternative552
food sources, it would be interesting to incorporate in future work such parameters that553
might influence the foraging decisions.554
Further research taking into consideration all these different factors will help us to555
better understand the reasons why and the conditions under which animals prefer to556
share their food.557
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Appendix A558
The densities of the different groups of the population,559
S,H,C,A and R, in the equilibrium conditions560
In the equilibrium conditions561
dS
dt
=
dH
dt
=
dC
dt
=
dA
dt
=
dR
dt
= 0. (14)
From the equation562
dC
dt
= 2p1p2νhSH −
1
tc
C = 0, (15)
it follows that in the equilibrium, the number of sharers is given by563
C = 2p1p2tcνhSH. (16)
Similarly, from the equations564
dA
dt
=
dR
dt
= 0, (17)
it is derived that the number of attackers and defenders in the equilibrium is given by565
A = R =
p1p3taνhSH
2
. (18)
Substituting equations (16) and (18) into the system of equations566
dS
dt
=
dH
dt
= 0, (19)
and solving the system for S using equation (6), it is obtained that in the equilibrium,567
the densities of the different groups of the population, S,H,C,A and R, are given by568
(7).569
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Appendix B570
Average time for a single animal to consume a food item571
Average time for a single searcher animal to consume a food item when en-572
countering a handler animal573
574
Assume that a mutant searcher playing (q1, q2, q3) has just come upon a handler575
playing the population strategy, (p1, p2, p3). If the mutant searcher ignores the handler,576
with probability 1 − q1, then it will need an average time T
∗
S until the consumption of577
a food item. Otherwise, if the mutant attacks, with probability q1, the average time578
needed for the consumption of a food item depends on the action that the handler579
animal will take. If the handler decides to share the food, with probability p2, then the580
further expected time required to the consumption of a whole food item by the mutant581
is T ∗C. If the attacked handler decides to defend its food, with probability p3, then a582
fight takes place and the attacking mutant will need an average time T ∗A to acquire and583
consume a food item. Finally, if the attacked animal decides to leave its food to the584
attacking animal without taking any action, with probability 1− p2 − p3, the attacking585
searcher animal becomes a handler and it then requires an average time T ∗H until the586
consumption of a food item. T ∗SA is given by the following equation587
T ∗SA = q1
(
p2T
∗
C + p3T
∗
A + (1− p2 − p3)T
∗
H
)
+ (1− q1)T
∗
S . (20)
Recall that we assume that two animals that share a food item do so equally. Each of the588
sharers needs a time tc until consumption of the half of the food and once it consumes589
it, it returns to the searching state. From the searching state, the mutant needs a time590
on average equal to T ∗S in order to consume a whole food item. The average time needed591
for a mutant sharer to consume a whole food item, T ∗C, is given by592
T ∗C = tc +
T ∗S
2
. (21)
The sharing process described above is, in terms of expected reward, entirely equivalent593
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to a process where if a searcher and a handler decide to share the food, at the end of the594
sharing period, with probability 0.5 one of the two animals obtains the food item while595
the other takes nothing. The loser then has to resume searching for a new food resource596
and thus spend an average time T ∗S until the consumption of a food item. Both animals597
suffer a time cost from the sharing process equal to tc. Hence, the time that a sharer598
needs for the consumption of a food item is on average equal to 0.5tc + 0.5(tc + T
∗
S ),599
which leads to (21).600
Substituting (21) into (20) we obtain601
T ∗SA = q1
(
p2tc + p3T
∗
A + (1− p2 − p3)T
∗
H
)
+
(
1− q1 +
q1p2
2
)
T ∗S . (22)
An attacker animal which has just been involved in a fight will have a cost of an average602
time ta/2 spent in the contest. With probability 1 − α the attacker loses the fight and603
starts searching again for food while with a complementary probability α, it beats the604
defender and acquires the food item. Thus, T ∗A is given by the following equation605
T ∗A =
ta
2
+ (1− α)T ∗S + αT
∗
H. (23)
A searcher animal is looking either for a food resource or a handler animal. At this stage,606
it spends an average time equal to 1
/
(νff + νhH) before it finds either an unattended607
food item (this happens with probability νff
/
(νff + νhH)) and becomes a handler or a608
handler animal (with probability νhH
/
(νff + νhH)). Thus, T
∗
S is given by the following609
equation610
T ∗S =
νhH
νff + νhH
T ∗SA +
νff
νff + νhH
T ∗H +
1
νff + νhH
. (24)
Once the searcher animal acquires a food item, it either consumes it without being found611
by any searcher animal, with probability (1/th)
/
((1/th) + νhS), or it is discovered by a612
searcher, with probability νhS
/
((1/th) + νhS), resulting in an additional expected time613
cost T ∗HA until the consumption of a food item. The average time that the animal is at614
the handling state before it either consumes its food item or is discovered by a searcher615
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animal is equal to 1
/
((1/th) + νhS). T
∗
H is thus given by616
T ∗H =
1
1 + thνhS
0 +
thνhS
1 + thνhS
T ∗HA +
th
1 + thνhS
. (25)
Substituting equations (23), (24) and (25) into (22), after some calculations we obtain617
equation (10).618
619
Average time for a single handler animal to consume a food item when620
encountering a searcher animal in an aggressive population621
622
If a mutant animal at the handling state is attacked by a searcher animal playing623
the population strategy, with a non-zero probability (p1 6= 0), then T
∗
HA is given by the624
following equation625
T ∗HA = p1
(
q2T
∗
C + q3T
∗
R + (1− q2 − q3)T
∗
S
)
+ (1− p1)T
∗
H, (26)
where T ∗R is the average time cost of the decision of a mutant handler to defend its food626
against a challenge. Substituting (21) into (26) we obtain627
T ∗HA = p1
(
q2tc + q3T
∗
R +
(
1−
q2
2
− q3
)
T ∗S
)
+ (1− p1)T
∗
H. (27)
In a similar way as before, T ∗R is given by628
T ∗R =
ta
2
+ αT ∗S + (1− α)T
∗
H. (28)
Substituting equations (24), (25) and (28) into (27), we obtain (11).629
630
Average time for a single handler animal to consume a food item in a non-631
aggressive population632
633
In the case where all the members of the population do not challenge, i.e. p1 = q1 =634
0, but occasionally a challenge might occur, the average time needed for an attacked
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handler mutant playing (0, q2, q3) to consume a food item, T
∗
HA, is given by636
T ∗HA = q2
(
tc +
T ∗S
2
)
+ q3T
∗
R + (1− q2 − q3)T
∗
S , (29)
where T ∗R is given by equation (28). Since the population is not making challenges,637
T ∗S =
1
νff
+ th and T
∗
H = th. Substituting into equation (29), we obtain (12).638
Appendix C639
The optimal strategy is always pure640
In the present model, there are 21 possible groups of strategies that an animal can play,641
6 of which consist of pure strategies and 15 of mixed strategies. These are summarised642
in Table 5.643
Strategies denoted by (*) in Table 5, are strategies with p2 = 0, that is, strategies644
where animals never share their food. In this case, the model reduces to the model645
considered in Broom et al. (2004). In this paper, the authors have shown that the mean646
time required for a searcher animal that has just encountered a handler to consume647
a food item is a strictly monotonic function (except with the possible exception of a648
non-generic parameter set, see below) of the probability with which the searcher attacks649
the handler, p1. Therefore, depending on the parameter values, the searcher animal650
minimises the time it needs for the consumption of a food item by playing either p1 = 0651
or p1 = 1. Any other strategy 0 < p1 < 1 results in a higher expected time and thus652
cannot be evolutionarily stable. Similarly, it has been shown that the average time653
needed for a handler to consume a food item after being attacked by a searcher is either654
a strictly increasing or a strictly decreasing function of p3 and therefore the optimal655
strategy is always either p3 = 0 or p3 = 1, depending on the parameter values.656
Strategies denoted by (**) are the two additional to the Broom et al. (2004) model657
pure strategies where p2 = 1, i.e. the strategies where animals always share their food658
when other animals attack. It has been shown in the present paper that under certain659
conditions one of these can be an ESS, the other not.660
In the case where none of the animals of the population behave aggressively, i.e.661
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p1 = q1 = 0 (strategies denoted by (***) in Table 5), the average time required for an662
attacked mutant handler that plays strategy (q1, q2, q3) to consume a food item, T
∗
HA, is663
a function of the form (see equation (12))664
T ∗HA = c1q2 + c2q3 + c3, (30)
where c1, c2 and c3 depend only on the parameters of the model ta, th, tc, νff and α.665
Hence, if the values of the parameters are such that c1 and c2 are both greater than zero,666
then the optimal strategy for the mutant is q2 = q3 = 0. In any other case, if c1 < c2,667
the optimal strategy is q2 = 1 and q3 = 0 while if c1 > c2 the optimal strategy is q2 = 0668
and q3 = 1.669
It remains to consider whether any of the strategies (S 1)–(S 7) is an ESS. Due to670
the complexity of the mathematical formulae, an analytic investigation is very difficult.671
Hence, we consider whether each of the remaining strategies is an ESS mainly through672
extensive numerical investigation.673
Regarding strategies (S 1), from equation (22) we get that in a population which674
plays strategy (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0),675
T ∗SA(0, 1, 0) = T
∗
S (0, 1, 0), (31)
while676
T ∗SA(1, 1, 0) = T
∗
C(1, 1, 0) = tc +
T ∗S (1, 1, 0)
2
. (32)
If there is any equilibrium strategy (p∗1, 1, 0) in (S 1), then TSA(p
∗
1, 1, 0) should be equal677
to T ∗SA(0, 1, 0) and T
∗
SA(1, 1, 0). But when T
∗
SA(0, 1, 0) = T
∗
SA(1, 1, 0) then T
∗
S (0, 1, 0) =678
T ∗S (1, 1, 0). Hence, equating equations (31) and (32) we get679
T ∗S (0, 1, 0) = T
∗
S (1, 1, 0) = TS(p
∗
1, 1, 0) = 2tc. (33)
On the other hand, if the strategy (p∗1, 1, 0) is an equilibrium strategy, then it cannot be
invaded by the mutant strategy (p∗1, 0, 0), i.e. the average required time for the mutant
handler that has just been attacked in a population which plays strategy (p∗1, 1, 0),
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T ∗HA(p
∗
1, 0, 0), is higher than the average time required when playing the population
strategy, THA(p
∗
1, 1, 0). Using equation (27) we find that
T ∗HA(p
∗
1, 0, 0) > THA(p
∗
1, 1, 0) (34)
⇒ T ∗S (p
∗
1, 0, 0) > TC(p
∗
1, 1, 0)⇒ T
∗
S (p
∗
1, 0, 0) = TS(p
∗
1, 1, 0) > 2tc. (35)
This contradicts (33). Consequently, there is no any equilibrium strategy (0 < p1 <680
1, 1, 0). This is also verified from the results of numerical examples for a wide range of681
parameter values (see Figure 6a for an example).682
In a similar way it is proved that there is no equilibrium strategy in the class of683
strategies (S 6). If there was an equilibrium strategy (0 < p∗1 < 1, 0 < p
∗
2 < 1, 0 < p
∗
3 <684
1), p∗2+p
∗
3 < 1 , then T
∗
HA(p
∗
1, 0, 0), T
∗
HA(p
∗
1, 1, 0) and T
∗
HA(p
∗
1, 0, 1) should all be identical,685
otherwise one of the strategies (p∗1, 0, 0), (p
∗
1, 1, 0), (p
∗
1, 0, 1) could invade (p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3). In686
this case, using equations (27) and (28) we find that687
TS(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3)− TH(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) =
1
1− α
ta
2
. (36)
On the other hand, if (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) is an equilibrium strategy, then T
∗
SA(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) =688
T ∗SA(1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = T
∗
SA(0, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) which yields that T
∗
SA(1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = T
∗
S (0, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = T
∗
S (1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) =689
T ∗S (p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3). Substituting into equation (24) we obtain that690
T ∗S (p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3)− T
∗
H(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) =
1
νff
. (37)
Hence, if a strategy of the (S 6) class is an equilibrium strategy, then (36) and (37) must691
hold. This leads to692
1− α = νff
ta
2
. (38)
i.e. that the probability of a challenger losing a fight is equal to the ratio of the expected693
duration of the fight and the mean time searching for food. These are all biologically-694
determined parameters, and we assume that the chance of their precise coincidence in695
this way is negligible (i.e. the case is non-generic). Thus, for example, such a case would696
correspond to a region of zero area in Figure 4, equivalent to the boundary lines.697
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Numerical investigation also indicates that mixed strategies are always invaded and698
so there are no mixed ESSs in the classes (S 4), (S 5) and (S 7).699
Concerning strategies (S 2) and (S 3), numerical examples on a wide range of parame-700
ter values also imply that for every value of p2, 0 < p2 < 1, strategies (0 < p1 < 1, p2, 0)701
can always be invaded either by strategy (0, p2, 0) or by strategy (1, p2, 0). On the702
other hand, numerical examples indicate that for given p∗1, 0 < p
∗
1 ≤ 1, there is a703
strategy p∗2, 0 < p
∗
2 < 1, such that for specific values of parameters all the invading704
strategies (p∗1, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 1, 0) do equally well in a population playing (p
∗
1, p
∗
2, 0), i.e.705
THA(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, 0) = T
∗
HA(p
∗
1, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 1, 0), while any other strategy does worse. Any other706
population playing a different strategy (p∗1, 0 < p2 < 1, 0), p2 6= p
∗
2, can be invaded707
either by the strategy (p∗1, 0, 0) or the strategy (p
∗
1, 1, 0) (see Figure 6b for an exam-708
ple). However, in a population which plays a strategy (p1, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 1, 0), the required709
time for an attacked handler playing the population strategy, THA(p1, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 1, 0),710
is less than that required by an attacked handler playing (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0). In other words, if711
an infinitesimal portion of the population deviates from the equilibrium strategy, the712
evolution will drive away the population from that equilibrium. Thus, according to the713
second condition of Maynard Smith and Price (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) for714
a strategy to be an ESS, the strategies (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0) cannot be ESS. Hence, none of the715
strategies (S 2) and (S 3) can be evolutionarily stable.716
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Table 1
The model notations
Population’s densities Meaning
P Density of the population
S,H,C,A,R
Density of searchers, handlers, sharers, attackers
and defenders
Model Parameters Meaning
νff Rate at which foragers find undiscovered food
νhH Rate at which foragers encounter handlers
th
Expected time for a handler to consume a food
item if it is not attacked
tc
Expected time for a sharer to consume the half
of a food item
ta/2 Expected duration of a fight
α The probability that the attacker wins the fight
Strategies Meaning
p1
The probability that a searcher attacks a handler
when they meet
p2
The probability that an attacked handler shares
its food item
p3
The probability that an attacked handler defends
its food item
843
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Table 2
Notations of the required times to the consumption of a food item from the different
foraging states
Notation Meaning
TSA
The average time needed for a searcher animal who has just
encountered a handler to acquire and consume a food item
THA
The average time needed for a handler animal who has just
encountered a searcher to consume a food item
TS
The average time needed for an animal who has just
become a searcher to acquire and consume a food item
TH
The average time needed for an animal who has just
become a handler to consume a food item
TA
The average time needed for an attacker who has just
engaged in a fight to acquire and consume a food item
TR
The average time needed for a defender who has just
engaged in a fight to consume a food item
TC
The average time needed for a sharer to consume a food
item
844
845
846
847
F
o
o
d
sh
a
rin
g
in
k
lep
to
p
a
ra
sitic
p
o
p
u
la
tio
n
s
37
Table 3
Conditions under which a mutant playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) cannot invade a population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3)
Mutant’s strategy, (q1, q2, q3)
(0,0,0) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (1,0,0) (1,1,0) (1,0,1)
Population’s
strategy,
(p1, p2, p3)
(0,0,0)
/ 2tc − th > 1
νff
νff >
2(1− α)
ta
The mutant
always invades — —
(C.1) (C.2) (C.3)
(0,1,0) 2tc − th <
1
νff
/ 2tc − th < ta − 1− 2α
νff —
2tc − th >
1
νff —
(C.4) (C.5) (C.6)
(0,0,1) νff <
2(1− α)
ta
2tc − th > ta −
1− 2α
νff
/
— — νff >
2α
ta
(C.7) (C.8) (C.9)
(1,0,0)
The mutant
never invades — —
/ 2tc − th > 1
νff
νff >
2(1− α)
ta
−
thνffνhP
thνff + 1
(C.10) (C.11) (C.12)
(1,1,0) — 2tc − th <
1
νff − νhHa
∗
— 2tc − th <
1
νff − νhHa
∗ / (2tc − th)(νff − ανhHa)νff <(taνff+α)νff+(1−α)((thνhP −
1)νff − (νff + νhP )thνhHa
)
∗
(C.13) (C.14) (C.15)
(1,0,1)
— — νff <
2α
ta
νff <
2(1− α)
ta
+ (1− 2α)νhHb
∗∗
(2tc − th)(νff + ανhHb) >
ta(νff + 2ανhHb) +
αth(νhP −νhHb)+2α−1
∗∗
/
(C.16) (C.17) (C.18)
∗Ha is given by the solution of the equation (2tc − th)νhH
2
a + (thνff + thνhP + 1)Ha − thνffP = 0.
∗∗Hb is given by the solution of the equation taνhH
2
b + (thνff + 1)Hb − thνffP = 0.
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Table 4
Conditions under which a mutant playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) cannot invade a population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3) in the special
case where 2tc = th
Mutant’s strategy, (q1, q2, q3)
(0,0,0) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (1,0,0) (1,1,0) (1,0,1)
Population’s
strategy,
(p1, p2, p3)
(0,0,0)
/ The mutant
always invades
νff >
2(1− α)
ta
The mutant
always invades
— —
(0,1,0)
The mutant
never invades
/
νff >
1− 2α
ta
—
The mutant
always invades
—
(0,0,1) νff <
2(1− α)
ta
νff <
1− 2α
ta
/
— — νff >
2α
ta
(1,0,0)
The mutant
never invades
— —
/ The mutant
always invades
νff >
2(1− α)
ta
−
thνffνhP
thνff + 1
(1,1,0) —
The mutant
never invades
—
The mutant
never invades
/ (taνff +α)(thνff + thνhP +
1)− (1− α)(thνff + 1) > 0
(1,0,1) — — νff <
2α
ta
νff <
2(1− α)
ta
+ (1− 2α)νhHb
∗
ta(νff+2ανhHb)+αth(νhP−
νhHb) + 2α− 1 < 0
∗
/
∗Hb is given by the solution of the equation taνhH
2
b + (thνff + 1)Hb − thνffP = 0.
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Table 5
Possible ESSs
Strategy at the handling state, p2, p3
p2 = 1 p2 = 0
p2 = p3 = 0
p2 = 0 0 < p2 < 1 0 < p2 < 1 0 < p2 < 1
p3 = 0 p3 = 1 0 < p3 < 1 p3 = 0 0 < p3 < 1 0 < p3 < 1
p2 + p3 = 1 p2 + p3 < 1
Strategy
at the
searching
state, p1
p1 = 0 ** * * * *** *** ***
0 < p1 < 1 S 1 * * * S 2 S 4 S 6
p1 = 1 ** * * * S 3 S 5 S 7
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Figure legends848
Figure 1: Schematic representation of all the possible events that might happen until849
the consumption of a food item by a mutant searcher playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) who850
encounters a handler of a population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3). The transition prob-851
abilities and the expected times (in bold) to move from one state to another are shown.852
Figure 2: Schematic representation of all the possible events that might happen until853
the consumption of a food item by a mutant handler playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) who854
encounters a searcher of a population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3). The transition prob-855
abilities and the expected times (in bold) to move from one state to another are shown.856
Figure 3: Graphs showing examples of the region where each of the four possible ESSs857
(Retaliator (R), Marauder (M), Attacking Sharer (AS) and Hawk (H)) is an ESS as the858
duration of the content, ta/2, and the handling time of a sharer, tc, vary. In each region,859
a single letter ‘X’ indicates that the strategy X is the unique ESS, ‘X,Y’ indicates that860
the strategies X and Y are simultaneous ESSs and ‘X, Y, Z’ that the three strategies861
X, Y and Z are simultaneous ESSs. (a) th = 3, νff = 0.5, νh = 1.5, α = 0.7, P = 1; (b)862
th = 3, νff = 1, νh = 2, α = 0.2, P = 1.863
Figure 4: Graphs showing examples of the region where each of the four possible ESSs864
(Retaliator (R), Marauder (M), Attacking Sharer (AS) and Hawk (H)) is an ESS as865
the density of the population, P , and the rate at which foragers find undiscovered food,866
νff , vary. In each region, a single letter ‘X’ indicates that the strategy X is the unique867
ESS, ‘X,Y’ indicates that the strategies X and Y are simultaneous ESSs and ‘X, Y, Z’868
that the three strategies X, Y and Z are simultaneous ESSs. (a) ta/2 = 0.5, th = 3, tc =869
4, νh = 1.5, α = 0.7; (b) ta/2 = 0.5, th = 3, tc = 2, νh = 2, α = 0.2.870
Figure 5: A graph showing an example of the region where each of the three pos-871
sible ESSs (Retaliator (R), Attacking Sharer (AS) and Hawk (H)) can occur in the872
special case where 2tc = th, as the probability α of the challenger winning and the873
duration of the content, ta/2, vary. In each region, a single letter ‘X’ indicates that the874
strategy X is the unique ESS, ‘X,Y’ indicates that the strategies X and Y are simulta-875
neous ESSs and ‘X, Y, Z’ that the three strategies X, Y and Z are simultaneous ESSs.876
2tc = th = 3, νff = 0.5, νh = 1.5, P = 1.877
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Figure 6: (a) The expected time until the consumption of a food item of mutant878
searcher animals playing strategies (0,1,0), (1,1,0) and (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0) in a popu-879
lation playing strategy (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0) for the example considered in Figure 3b for880
tc = 2. Numerical examples indicate that in every population which adopts a strat-881
egy (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0), either a mutant animal that plays strategy (0, 1, 0) or a mu-882
tant animal that plays strategy (1, 1, 0) always does better than any other animal that883
uses the population strategy. Thus, such populations can be invaded by those mutant884
strategies and as a result, strategies (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0) cannot be ESSs. (b) The ex-885
pected time until the consumption of a food item of mutant handler animals playing886
strategies (0.8,1,0), (0.8,0,0) and (0.8, 0 < p2 < 1, 0) in a population playing strategy887
(0.8, 0 < p2 < 1, 0) for th = 3, tc = 2, νff = 1, νh = 1.5, P = 1. An equilibrium strategy888
(0 < p1 ≤ 1, 0 < p2 < 1, 0) cannot be evolutionarily stable.889
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T
∗
SA
tc
1
2(νff+νhH)
⊲
νhH
2(νf f+νhH)
⊲
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∗
HA
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∗
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q1(1−p2−p3)
⊲
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⊲
th
1+thνhS ⊲
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⊲
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2
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⊲
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1
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⊲
1−q1
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νff+νhH
⊲
1−α
⊲
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△
νhH
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Figure 1
Schematic representation of all the possible events that might happen until the consumption
of a food item by a mutant searcher playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) who encounters a handler of a
population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3). The transition probabilities and the expected times (in
bold) to move from one state to another are shown.
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Figure 2
Schematic representation of all the possible events that might happen until the consumption
of a food item by a mutant handler playing strategy (q1, q2, q3) who encounters a searcher of a
population playing strategy (p1, p2, p3). The transition probabilities and the expected times (in
bold) to move from one state to another are shown.
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a) b)
Figure 3
Graphs showing examples of the region where each of the four possible ESSs (Retaliator (R),
Marauder (M), Attacking Sharer (AS) and Hawk (H)) is an ESS as the duration of the content,
ta/2, and the handling time of a sharer, tc, vary. In each region, a single letter ‘X’ indicates that
the strategy X is the unique ESS, ‘X,Y’ indicates that the strategies X and Y are simultaneous
ESSs and ‘X, Y, Z’ that the three strategies X, Y and Z are simultaneous ESSs. (a) th = 3, νff =
0.5, νh = 1.5, α = 0.7, P = 1; (b) th = 3, νff = 1, νh = 2, α = 0.2, P = 1.
a) b)
Figure 4
Graphs showing examples of the region where each of the four possible ESSs (Retaliator (R),
Marauder (M), Attacking Sharer (AS) and Hawk (H)) is an ESS as the density of the population,
P , and the rate at which foragers find undiscovered food, νff , vary. In each region, a single letter
‘X’ indicates that the strategy X is the unique ESS, ‘X,Y’ indicates that the strategies X and Y
are simultaneous ESSs and ‘X, Y, Z’ that the three strategies X, Y and Z are simultaneous ESSs.
(a) ta/2 = 0.5, th = 3, tc = 4, νh = 1.5, α = 0.7; (b) ta/2 = 0.5, th = 3, tc = 2, νh = 2, α = 0.2.
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Figure 5
A graph showing an example of the region where each of the three possible ESSs (Retaliator
(R), Attacking Sharer (AS) and Hawk (H)) can occur in the special case where 2tc = th, as
the probability α of the challenger winning and the duration of the content, ta/2, vary. In each
region, a single letter ‘X’ indicates that the strategy X is the unique ESS, ‘X,Y’ indicates that
the strategies X and Y are simultaneous ESSs and ‘X, Y, Z’ that the three strategies X, Y and
Z are simultaneous ESSs. 2tc = th = 3, νff = 0.5, νh = 1.5, P = 1.
a) b)
Figure 6
(a) The expected time until the consumption of a food item of mutant searcher animals playing
strategies (0,1,0), (1,1,0) and (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0) in a population playing strategy (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0)
for the example considered in Figure 3b for tc = 2. Numerical examples indicate that in every
population which adopts a strategy (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0), either a mutant animal that plays strategy
(0, 1, 0) or a mutant animal that plays strategy (1, 1, 0) always does better than any other animal
that uses the population strategy. Thus, such populations can be invaded by those mutant
strategies and as a result, strategies (0 < p1 < 1, 1, 0) cannot be ESSs. (b) The expected time
until the consumption of a food item of mutant handler animals playing strategies (0.8,1,0),
(0.8,0,0) and (0.8, 0 < p2 < 1, 0) in a population playing strategy (0.8, 0 < p2 < 1, 0) for
th = 3, tc = 2, νff = 1, νh = 1.5, P = 1. An equilibrium strategy (0 < p1 ≤ 1, 0 < p2 < 1, 0)
cannot be evolutionarily stable.
